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The New Agrarian Movement in Mexico 
1979-1990 
Introduction 
Recent research on Mexican popular movements has focused attention on 
the new elements which have characterised political strategies and forms of 
internal organisation in the 1980s. It has also tried to establish the ways in 
which new movements have made an impact on the political system. In 
approaching these issues, we need to be wary of either romanticising or 
dismissing particular movements and instead look for the precise nature of 
their novelty and political importance.1 This paper attempts to draw out what 
is new about two national peasant movements in Mexico which operate 
independently of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and its 
affiliated Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC). These are the Coordi-
nadora Nacional Plan de Ayala (CNPA), formed in 1979 and the Union 
Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autonomas (UNORCA), 
formed in 1985. As Appendix I shows, they are only two of many peasant 
movements currently active in Mexico. They have been chosen precisely 
because they are 'new' in that they have both sought to retain autonomy 
from all political parties and to promote broad participation of the base.2 
The extent to which autonomy from parties and decentralised decision-
making have been achieved has, of course, been contingent on more than just 
an alternative vision of collective action, although this element should not be 
forgotten. Without anticipating too much of what is to follow, we can say that 
peasant movements in Mexico have been pushed into a defensive position 
in the 1980s, which has had a negative impact on their attempts to build 
more democratic forms of internal organisation. Absorbed by the day-to-day 
necessity of surviving the economic crisis, influential groups within CNPA 
and UNORCA steered clear of the electoral arena just when it was becoming 
the regime's weakest flank. Other member organisations, tempted by political 
parties, exercised their right to make up their own minds and support 
opposition candidates. As a result, CNPA was weakened by internal divisions, 
while some UNORCA groups supported the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari, in the 1988 presidential elections. Others supported the centre-left 
coalition led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. Although relations between peasants 
and his new Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) cannot be described 
as 'organic', the emergence of neocardenismo may be of central importance 
for both the party and the new agrarian movement in the 1990s. 
The paper begins by addressing a currently influential argument within the 
Mexican government that the new agrarian movement is capable of taking 
over many of the functions of the State as it retreats under the weight of 
fiscal crisis and in response to the recommendations of the International 
Monetary Fund. To be sure, there are some suggestive examples, of self-
management, or autogestion, which the authorities are keen to publicise. Yet 
the reality for the majority of peasants in Mexico in 1990 is not so 
encouraging. It was not much better in 1980 but the failures of the short-
lived Sistema Alimentario Mexicano (SAM) in 1980-1982 have been 
compounded one hundred-fold by the neoliberal policies implemented in 
response to the debt crisis. By focusing on a handful of promising success-
ful cases we are only blinding ourselves to the desperate plight of the many 
unsuccessful ones. The new agrarian movement is not just the productive and 
the relatively autonomous. It is also the weak, the undercapitalised, the 
dependent and the repressed. For the capacity of poor peasants to mobilise 
against government policies is not in doubt. Countless marches, demonstra-
tions and national meetings are evidence of this. In short, there is much 
scepticism regarding the extent to which self-managed, democratic production 
can be developed within the government's current macro-economic strategy. 
The discussion then turns to the thorny question of what is new about to-
day's agrarian movement. Historians as familiar with Mexican politics as 
Alan Knight are entitled to ask if the movements we see are really new or 
is it simply that our research interests have changed (Knight, 1990). The 
answer is probably both, at least in this case. The state-centred analyses of 
Mexico's political development, which seemed at one point as monolithic as 
the regime they sought to describe, provoked enough youthful dissatisfaction 
to shift attention towards the under-researched associations of post-1968 civil 
society. At its peril, the research programme, like many I suspect, paid only 
lip service to the period after 1940, half accepting the statist thesis, while 
convinced that it was no longer applicable to the 1970s and 1980s. Returning 
to 'history', we find that all was not calm in 1940-1965 and that the tradition 
of peasant struggle did not go underground but continued to present a radical 
challenge to the ruling party as it turned rightwards. 
Yet the empirical evidence suggests that a qualitatively different type of 
peasant movement existed in this period, one which was closely related to 
political parties and often characterised by single leaders. These features were 
part of their strength, but also part of the problem. When parties and leaders 
became targets for repression or candidates for co-optation, peasant 
movements suffered as a result. The changes since 1968 are therefore seen 
with that backdrop in mind, rather than a simplistic one of an all pervasive 
State and a docile civil society. Furthermore, the continuities in peasant 
movements are inescapable. Are there any demands with a greater resonance 
in Mexican history than those for land and liberty? 
The middle sections of the paper discuss the emergence and development 
of CNPA in its struggle for land and UNORCA in its struggle for control 
over production and marketing. The final section discusses the response of 
the new agrarian movement to the presidential elections of 1988 and their 
position towards Cardenas and the PRD, on the one hand, and the initiatives 
taken by the Salinas government on the other. The conclusions reflect on the 
political implications of the changes in State-peasant relations brought about 
by neoliberalism and the economic crisis and the challenge which now faces 
groups such as CNPA and UNORCA. 
The new agrarian movement: 
self-management and self-defence 
Several authors have argued that the breakdown of corporatist control and 
the liberation of the creative potential of the peasantry from the corrupt 
network of private intermediaries, regional bosses (caciques) and State 
agencies are necessary conditions for the solution of Mexico's agricultural 
crisis. Pointing to the positive experiences of autonomous producer organisati-
ons in Sonora, Nayarit, Hidalgo and Chiapas, Rello maintains that the 
collective action of the peasantry could be the main force in the transform-
ation of the agrarian structure and of the global project of economic 
development.3 Despite the obstacles, Rello places his faith in the 'transform-
ing potential of collective action'. The elements which he identifies as 
important to such a project are several. 
First, there is the strength of community solidarity in the defence of its 
interests, in spite of a hostile political environment. Secondly, despite initial 
defeats, the capacity for collective action is something which can be 
conserved and augmented, becoming the 'social energy' of a movement which 
determines subsequent advances. The historical memory of earlier struggles 
feeds into popular conceptions of present ones, providing lessons from the 
past. Rello thus criticises the pessimistic view which conflates short-term 
failures with permanent weakness. A more historical perspective reveals the 
continuity of peasant resistance in Latin America.4 Furthermore, collective 
action was central to the construction of democratic institutions and the 
defence of social rights in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in 
Europe. Finally, the increased sense of empowerment through achievement 
of basic demands can break with resignation and dependence on outside 
agents. Collective action can provide an organised response to social 
inequalities and increase self-confidence through a cumulative process. 
Although this process is often halted by regional power structures, it leaves 
behind a sediment of participatory experience which can be used to greater 
effect in more favourable circumstances. 
Otero also argues that self-managed, democratic control of production is 
a viable grassroots alternative to the full proletarianisation of the rural labour 
force, most of which is employed only seasonally as wage labour. He 
illustrates his argument with the successful example of the Coalicion de 
Ejidos Colectivos de los Valles Yaqui y Mayo (CECVYM) of Sonora, which 
was formed following President Echeverrfa's celebrated expropriation of 
private owners in December 1976 (Sanderson, 1981). Otero claims that the 
CECVYM constitutes a model of 'post-capitalist' production, since its 
members control production decisions in a democratic manner. He says: 
'...the CECVYM today provides exemplary organizational lessons in both 
political (democratic and independent) and economic (productive) terms for 
the agrarian movement in Mexico and elsewhere.'5 
Indeed, the Coalition became an attractive model for regional producer 
organisations from other states who came to visit and learn from its 
experience. 
Without dismissing the achievements of CECVYM and the arguments 
which Otero, Rello and others use to suggest its potential social and political 
importance, it should be remembered that the Coalition has had the unusual 
advantage of being in possession of prime irrigated land. The possibilities to 
develop an alternative political organisation were enhanced by a sound 
economic base. This cannot be said for most of the country's social sector. 
In most regions the obstacles to self-managed production remain formidable. 
According to official data, only 1.8 per cent of lands held by the social sector 
is irrigated. Most is located in rain-fed regions.6 
Nevertheless, such cases have provided part of the government bureaucracy 
with a strong argument for transferring functions to the social sector. The 
most influential voice in this respect has been that of Gustavo Gordillo, who 
was named sub-secretary of social pacts ('concertacion,) of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Resources (SARH) in December 1988. Gordillo was 
one of the main advisors to groups such as the CECVYM and through this 
experience argued for the need for the appropriation of the productive process 
by the direct producers (Gordillo, 1988). The main problems he identified 
were the corruption and inefficiency of the State agencies which dealt with 
the ejido sector which excluded peasants from decision-making and from 
control over the distribution of their surplus. This line of thought became 
important in several regions during the 1980s as new producer organisations 
emerged to demand control over production, credit and marketing, most of 
which joined in the formation of UNORCA in 1985. In the context of an 
economic crisis which has hit the social sector hardest, peasant organisations 
of all affiliations have come together to defend their interests. Fox and 
Gordillo have thus argued that we should no longer speak of a strict 
dichotomy between 'official' and 'independent' organisations, but of the 
emergence of a new middle ground, or 'political grey area' occupied by 
alliances of nominally official and independent movements whose common 
aim is to reduce their vulnerability in the market and their dependence on the 
State.7 
Fox and Gordillo point out that such a process of realignments could lead 
in one of two directions. On the one hand, the new relationship with the State 
could privilege those groups which have relatively good land or productive 
potential at the expense of the majority of poorer peasants. On the other, this 
new political grey area could be extended to include the latter. For Fox and 
Gordillo the direction of the new agrarian movement depends on the strategic 
choices of peasant leaders. 
While most authors share this appreciation for grassroots autonomy, many 
are sceptical that the existing balance of forces favours such a transform-
ation. Sarmiento (1989) argues that the crisis has broken up the corporatist 
pact between the State and the labour and peasant sectors, while in its place 
a new, neo-corporatist relation is being established. Carlsen also argues that 
groups such as those affiliated to UNORCA may underestimate the strength 
and tenacity of corporatism and overestimate the government's willingness to 
sacrifice political control in favour of modernisation of production. Further-
more, she warns against the real possibility that the new leaders will become 
co-opted by bureaucratic agencies.8 Finally, Hernandez argues that since 1988 
the government's policy of negotiation with opposition movements has tended 
to favour the more consolidated organisations with some experience of self-
management in production. He adds that the majority of poor peasants in 
rain-fed regions, and agricultural workers, without strong organisations, have 
been left without representation and without resources. This reveals the other 
side to the policy of negotiation: exclusion.9 
Garcia de Leon (1989) is even more pessimistic regarding the fate of the 
agrarian movement in Mexico. He argues that in the past decade peasant 
movements have taken up defensive positions as a result of the economic 
crisis. Immediate survival has become the main concern, displacing the 
overtly political tone which characterised the movements of the 1970s. As a 
result, an infinite number of dispersed and atomised movements have 
struggled to keep afloat in a sea of poverty and exclusion created by the debt 
crisis and the austerity measures.10 
Garcia de Leon adds that the optimistic belief in the emergence of 
collective agents, who are capable of providing solutions to injustice and 
inequality, has been overtaken by the dramatic reality of the crisis. In their 
struggle to survive, peasant movements have directed their demands towards 
the State in isolated fashion. The latter can thus respond with divide-and-
rule tactics, offering selective concessions while isolating movements from 
the new political force which emerged in support of the presidential 
candidacy of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in 1988. He laments that some organisa-
tions which maintained an anti-party position failed to take notice of the 
importance of the cardenista movement in 1988. Despite the dubious election 
results, by January 1989 most peasant organisations were negotiating 
agreements for resources with the President and discussing the formation of 
a new national body to include official and independent movements, known 
as the Congres'o Agrario Permanente (CAP). As a result, leaders gradually 
became absorbed by negotiations with middle-level bureaucracy. The 
negotiation table, not the Zocalo, has become the point at which to apply 
pressure. The new 'political grey area', in which Gordillo and others placed 
their hopes, has turned out to be the CAP, which may represent nothing more 
than 'the sum of defeated forces'.11 
Indeed, the devastating impact of the economic crisis in the countryside 
cannot be overstated. A brief survey of the official statistics gives some idea 
of the extent to which peasant demands have been disregarded in the past 
decade. The agricultural sector suffered more than any other from the 
austerity measures imposed after 1982, suggesting that the boom in 
manufacturing exports was in part financed at the expense of the decapitalis-
ation of the rural sector, particularly the social sector. Public spending in 
agriculture fell from 8.1 per cent of the total budget in 1980 to 3.5 per cent 
in 1986.12 Between 1983 and 1987 the budget of those government agencies 
which operate in the countryside fell by 62.3 per cent.13 The share which 
agriculture received of the total amount of credit provided by the nationalised 
banking system fell from 15.2 per cent in 1982 to 8.2 per cent in 1986. At 
the same time, credit became more expensive as interest rates jumped from 
12.5 per cent to 96 per cent in 1982-88. In 1987, of 28,000 ejidos existing 
in Mexico only 12,000 received credit and of 8.5 million hectares under 
maize cultivation only 3 million were insured against crop failure. In real 
terms the amount of public expenditure in agriculture in 1986 had fallen 
below the 1973 level.14 
The decapitalisation of the rural economy was exacerbated by increasing 
production costs. Between 1981 and 1987 the guarantee price for maize 
increased by a factor of 37.6, while the cost of diesel oil went up by 178, 
gasoline by 82 and tractors by 64.3. It has been calculated that in 1982 it cost 
35 tonnes of beans or 84.7 tonnes of maize to buy one tractor. In 1988 the 
same tractor cost 71 tonnes of beans or 152.1 tonnes of maize.15 
Decapitalisation and spiralling production costs have obviously had an 
uneven impact on different groups of rural producers. The capitalist farmers 
who rely more on the use of wage labour than capital investment (in 
tomatoes, strawberries, melons, etc.) have tried to compensate for depressed 
prices by holding down wages. For their part, the poor and middle peasants 
have had to reduce their consumption levels as income has been squeezed. 
Agricultural workers are employed at salaries half their 1976 level while 
ejidatarios are obliged to rent land to multinational companies for whom they 
work as peons. According to a study carried out at the Autonomous 
University of Chapingo, nutrition levels in some areas of rural Mexico have 
returned to their 1936 level.16 A former Minister of Health estimates that 
approximately 50 per cent of the rural population currently suffers from first, 
second or third degree malnutrition.17 According to UNICEF, Mexico now 
figures among the countries with a high risk of malnutrition and infant 
mortality. Absenteeism from school and poor performance are also seen as 
related to poor diet. Of course, these are structural problems with long roots 
and external determinants which go beyond the policies of the past eight 
years. Yet it is not clear that shifting responsibilities from the State to the 
market has provided adequate responses to the problems of rural poverty. 
If the problems of ejidatarios were bad enough, then the landless were 
even more unfortunate. The agrarian policy of President Jose Lopez Portillo 
(1976-82) was designed to regain the confidence of private landowners after 
their clashes with his predecessor, Luis Echeverria (1970-76). Declaring that 
land reform would be brought to an end in his term, the president announced 
a new era in which productivity would come before redistribution. The 
landowners' associations breathed a sigh of relief. However, the new regional 
peasant movements were not convinced. Land invasions continued but now, 
in a different political context, came up against repression. 
Through co-ordinated actions and mass mobilisations, the issue of land 
reform was kept alive until the next sexenio. The government of Miguel de 
la Madrid (1982-88) used another tactic to bring agrarian reform to a close: 
the National Programme for the Register of Rural Property and the Regulari-
sation of Land Tenure, or Catastro Rural. The programme was designed to 
document via satellite pictures the structure of land tenure in the entire 
Republic. Many landowners who held areas exceeding the legal limits of what 
are euphemistically known as 'small properties' moved quickly to protect 
their holdings for fear of expropriation. There was an unprecedented rise in 
the number of petitions for certificates of non-affectability which protect 
owners from the possibility of expropriation for the purposes of redistribution. 
With the help of computer technology, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform 
(SRA) responded to the wishes of the CNA. The percentages of certificates 
issued by the de la Madrid government as proportions of all certificates 
issued since 1917 were 95 per cent in the case of cattle ranchers and over 50 
per cent in the case of crop producers.18 Satellite photography, computerised 
data banks and laser printers, all at the service of neolatifundismo. 
Meanwhile, land hunger continued as employment opportunities shrank in 
the rest of the economy. By 1987 petitioners were still waiting for the 
implementation of one thousand presidential resolutions in favour of 
redistribution, covering over 7.6 million hectares. Another 8 million hectares 
are protected by certificates of non-affectability which are no longer valid 
and another 1.5 million hectares are claimed as exceeding the legal limits.19 
According to official figures, by the end of 1986 some 43.2 per cent of the 
rural economically active population, some 3.2 million persons, were 
landless.20 
The scale of these problems for the new agrarian movement is not lost on 
peasant leaders. In a realistic assessment which nevertheless holds out some 
hope, Javier Gil, a member of the national co-ordinating committee of 
UNORCA and co-ordinator of the CAP in 1989 says: 
'Maybe we won't even figure in the picture that is Mexico in the year 
2000. Maybe we will be overrun by the multinationals. But for that reason 
we have to act now. It all depends on the balance of forces. We must 
change them with our actions, with our proposals, our alternatives. We 
cannot wait and expect the State to intervene out of the goodness of its 
heart and protect us. Things have changed and we have to take our part in 
the defence of the social sector because no-one will do it for us.'21 
Nevertheless, according to Emilio Garcia of CNPA, the formation of the 
CAP has undermined an earlier effort to form a truly independent movement 
on a national scale and has allowed the government to contain the opposition 
to its policies for modernisation: 
'Five of the ten independent organisations which had signed the Convenio 
de Accion Unitaria (CAU) in December 1988 left to join the CAP. 
Although they said they would support both projects, in practice they have 
spent more time with the latter. This is understandable since it has more 
chance of achieving something, given that-the government has supported 
it. But it means that the movement is divided. For example, on April 10, 
the anniversary of Zapata's assassination, CNPA marched to the Zocalo 
almost alone. This time the other organisations were in Cuautla, signing 
agreements with the government for their projects. The CAP has tended to 
deactivate the movements, the leaders have been tied closer to the 
negotiating table and do not mobilise to protest against everything else that 
is going on, the repression, the landlessness, the lack of democracy, etc. 
Yes, we must negotiate with the government but avoid being co-opted.'22 
Government policy does not, of course, respond solely to the pressures of 
the IMF and the World Bank. As Javier Gil notes, groups such as UNORCA 
and CNPA are engaged in an ideological and political struggle to win over 
the balance of forces in favour of the social sector. Since 1982 this balance 
has clearly favoured the private agro-export sector, which became organised 
as the Consejo Nacional Agropecuario (CNA) in 1984. The CNA also had the 
political backing of Manuel Clouthier, the presidential candidate of the 
conservative Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN) in 1988. Its strength as a 
pressure group was seen by the massive distribution of certificates of non-
affectability and it was able to use its political weight in support of PAN 
candidates in the northern states. The CNA has also demanded the liberalisa-
tion of guarantee prices and the privatisation of parastatal companies dealing 
with production, marketing and inputs.23 
Change within continuity: 
independent peasant movements and 1968 
If the new agrarian movement is more than a relatively small number of 
successful cases of self-management, then we need to establish where its 
novelty lies. Rather than representing a radically new development in Mexico, 
CNPA and UNORCA should be seen in historical perspective as inheritors 
of a long tradition of peasant struggles. Not surprisingly, they have also 
brought new perspectives to these struggles. 
Historically, Mexican peasants have been among the most rebellious and 
revolutionary in Latin America (Coatsworth, 1988). Central to their 
mobilising capacity has been a degree of autonomy from the State. The 
revolutionary army led by Emiliano Zapata in 1910-1919 grew out of the 
indigenous villages of Morelos. The villages provided the physical and 
political space with which to organise and plan the recuperation of communal 
land from encroaching sugar planters. Moreover, they were centres of self-
government, where decision-making was organised independently of the State 
and the ruling classes. The struggle of the Zapatistas was therefore not simply 
for land but also for municipal autonomy (Gilly, 1980; Warman, 1988). Their 
military and political defeat, combined with the assassination of Zapata in 
1919 by supporters of President Venustiano Carranza, undermined the 
autonomy of peasant communities. Agrarian reform became institutionalised 
by the post-revolutionary governments and Zapatistas had to petition for the 
recognition of lands which they had taken back in the phase of armed 
struggle. However, the programme proceeded slowly as national politicians 
feared alienating the more productive landowners. 
Redistribution in the 1920s was dependent on the linkages between 
regional strongmen, or caudillos, and the federal government. The administra-
tion of President Plutarco Elias Calles (1924-28) and those of his loyal 
successors tried to subdue reformist state governors whom they considered 
a threat to the centralisation of power. Repression became commonplace, 
forcing many peasant leagues into a defensive position. 
Consequently, when Lazaro Cardenas stood for the presidency in 1934 he 
received massive support in rural areas. As governor of Michoacan he had 
implemented a broad programme of land redistribution. In his struggle to free 
himself of the influence of Calles, Cardenas found important allies in the 
labour and peasant movements. The re-organisation of peasant leagues 
affiliated to the official party was completed with the foundation of the CNC 
in 1938. The repression of the Calles years, combined with the Cardenas 
reforms, led most of the organised peasantry into forming an alliance with a 
government committed to expanding support for the social sector.24 
However, the subordination of the CNC to the ruling party and the State 
was made clear after 1940 when official policy shifted in favour of private 
agribusiness interests. The shift had begun towards the end of Cardenas's 
presidency due to fears of lost investment and landowner support for fascism 
in Mexico, but was unambiguously adopted by the administrations of Manuel 
Avila Camacho (1940-46) and Miguel Aleman (1946-52). Reforms to the 
Agrarian Code in 1942 and 1946 made protection from expropriation easier 
to obtain, while public investment in irrigation works and rural infrastructure 
and preferential credit were targeted on large-scale agro-export enterprises in 
the north-west. The political weakness of the CNC was revealed by its failure 
to mobilise effectively against the counter-reform measures (Huizer, 1982; 
Hardy, 1984). At the same time, attempts to organise along independent lines 
were frustrated by the governments of Miguel Aleman, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 
(1952-58) and Adolfo Lopez Mateos (1958-64). 
From the mid-1940s on, regional independent movements emerged as 
grassroots leaders became frustrated with the slow pace of agrarian reform. 
The most important of these was in Morelos where, between 1945 and 1962, 
Ruben Jaramillo led a mass movement in protest against the corruption of 
local sugar mill owners and in favour of land reform and democratisation of 
municipal and state government. The movement not only fought over agrarian 
issues, but also on the electoral front as the Partido Agrario Obrero 
Morolense (PAOM). The two fronts of struggle, as for Zapata, remained 
inextricably linked due to the economic power wielded by those in political 
office. It was precisely the PAOM's political threat that provoked the 
intransigence of the authorities. Perhaps a less 'political' and more 'agrarian' 
movement would have been accommodated in a more amenable way. 
However, the point is that the 'agrarian' in Mexico is also the 'political'. 
The problem for peasant movements has traditionally been how best to 
operate 'politically': in the narrow sense of electoral struggle, in the broader 
sense of raising consciousness or, as in the case of the PAOM, a combination 
of both. As it was, the jaramillistas were forced into clandestinity by 
government repression and set up armed self-defence units to protect peasant 
lands against local caciques. Although Jaramillo won the solidarity of other 
popular movements in nearby Mexico City, it was not enough to resist the 
attacks which were co-ordinated by local elite groups. Following a brief 
period of legalised political activity, in May 1962 Jaramillo and his family 
were captured and executed by troops and judicial police. No culprit was ever 
found (de Grammont, 1988a). 
In the more general context of popular discontent with the reversal of 
Cardenas's reforms, dissident labour unions and peasant movements joined 
the Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico (UGOCM) in 1949, 
affiliated to the new Partido Popular (PP).25 
In the north-western states the UGOCM and PP confronted similar 
responses to those seen in Morelos. When the UGOCM led land invasions in 
1958 its principal leader, Jacinto Lopez, was imprisoned along with other 
important members. Moreover, when the disputed lands were distributed it 
was the CNC and not the UGOCM which benefited most, despite the fact 
that the latter had been at the forefront of the struggle (de Grammont, 1988b). 
Whereas in Morelos the party-movement link provoked repression, in the case 
of the PP-UGOCM link the response was more complex. The PAOM was a 
regionally defined party and its candidates did not aspire to seats in the 
national government. The PP, on the other hand, was a national party of the 
opposition, led by the former cardenista Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The 
PRI offered some concessions to the PP leadership in exchange for its 'loyal 
opposition' in the Chamber of Deputies. This coincided with Lombardo's 
preferred strategy of avoiding confrontations with the government and seeking 
incremental gains by getting PP candidates elected (and then ratified) by the 
ruling party. This strategy was seen by Jacinto Lopez as doomed to failure, 
given the size of the PRI majority. In fact, Lombardo was criticised for 
putting his personal well-being before that of the party and the UGOCM. A 
split was avoided until 1967 but relations were inevitably strained. As the PP 
leadership became divorced from the base, the UGOCM in Sonora and 
Sinaloa suffered setbacks in their struggle to defend the social sector. As a 
result, it was unable to resist the offensive of the right in the early 1960s and 
finally split into an independent and a pro-government faction in 1973. 
The third major challenge to the government's agrarian policies came in 
1963 with the formation of the Central Campesina Independiente (CCI). This 
was the largest opposition confederation and brought together some of the 
most distinguished regional leaders, including Ramon Danzos Palomino from 
the Yaqui Valley of Sonora, Arturo Orona from the collective ejidos of the 
Comarca Lagunera (Coahuila and Durango) and Alfonso Garzon from Baja 
California. More importantly, the CCI was not an isolated peasant movement 
but formed a central part of the Movimiento de Liberation Nacional (MLN), 
a broad left coalition led by Lazaro Cardenas, which united the major 
cardenista and Communist groups displaced from power in the previous two 
decades. Like the UGOCM, the CCI demanded the revitalisation of land 
reform, an end to repression, democratisation and respect for the right to 
organise independently of the ruling party and its union confederations. 
In 1964 the government again used repression in an attempt to demoralise 
the CCI, imprisoning its most radical leaders, including Danzos Palomino. In 
the context of the Cuban Revolution and the anti-communist propaganda from 
the right, the MLN and CCI were soon forced onto the defensive and their 
offices were ransacked by police. A split emerged in the CCI as the more 
moderate factions led by Humberto Serrano and Alfonso Garzon restated their 
support for the government and tried to expel the communist-affiliated 
faction.26 Serrano and Garzon gave their support to the administration of 
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-70) while the communists remained independent 
of the PRI but seriously weakened. Following the release of Danzos 
Palomino, the latter group renamed itself the Central Independiente de 
Obreros Agrfcolas y Campesinos (CIOAC) in 1975.27 
The lessons of the PAOM, UGOCM and CCI were confronted by the next 
generation of activists who sought to maintain the vision of 'land and liberty'. 
This remarkable generation was comprised of students, school teachers, 
Catholic lay preachers and priests, and the sons of ejidatarios and comuneros 
(members of indigenous communities). Each group emerged from simulta-
neous processes of social change: the expansion of university education and 
the teacher training programme for rural areas, the option for the poor taken 
by the Catholic Church and the increasing pressure on available land. 
Together they shaped the political strategies and forms of organisation which 
peasant movements adopted in the 1970s. 
The year 1968 marks an important break in Mexican political history. The 
regime suffered a deep crisis of legitimacy following the repression of the 
student movement at Tlatelolco. It responded with a revival of populism but 
had to go further than in previous administrations and open to a greater 
degree the political system to the opposition. Yet, for the peasant move-
ments, lessons had to be drawn from the experiences of the previous decades. 
A central current within the student movement, with links to rural teacher 
training colleges, held that the left 's strategy of seeking socialism via 
parliamentary means was mistaken. The renamed Partido Popular Socialista 
(PPS) and the PCM were criticised for their lack of organic links with the 
people and for their centralised internal structures. Instead, the task was to 
turn the model upside down and build democratic mass organisations from the 
bottom-up. In the early 1970s thousands of students went to villages and 
poor urban neighbourhoods, or colonias populares, to put the Maoist theory 
of the 'mass line' into practice. Socialism was conceived as something 
constructed through long-term politicisation of economic demands, not as the 
imminent smashing of the State. The failure of the guerrilla movements in 
Mexico served to confirm this position. State power was to be eroded by an 
increasingly politicised mass movement, not overthrown in an instant. This 
strategy also allowed for concrete demands to be met in the process. This 
current began life as Politica Popular (PP) in 1968 and in the 1970s 
developed into two tendencies: the Linea de Masas (LM) in the urban context 
and the Lfnea Proletaria (LP) in the rural areas and among industrial 
unions. 
In the countryside, the student activists joined forces with new leaders 
from the communities themselves. These latter often included sons of 
peasants who had trained to be teachers or participated in bible readings 
promoted by liberation theology. In areas where the CNC had been 
traditionally dominant, this new generation criticised the corruption of their 
leaders and the lack of participation of the base in decision-making. In areas 
where opposition movements such as those described above were active, 
peasants were wary of repeating earlier mistakes. In general, a critique of past 
strategies and forms of organisation gained acceptance around two issues: the 
relationship to political parties of the opposition; and the relationship between 
leaders and base. In most cases the demands remained the same, although an 
increasing emphasis on issues of production became common after 1976. 
The repression of those peasant groups most closely identified with the 
PAOM, MLN, Partido Popular and PPS was one reason why the post-1968 
movements adopted an independent position towards all political parties. 
More importantly, however, in most parts of Mexico in the early 1970s there 
were no opposition parties seeking to mobilise the rural masses. The PAOM 
and MLN had disappeared, while the PPS supported the government. The 
PCM, as the students argued, had little presence in the countryside. 
Nevertheless, the strategy proposed was not to build another party-movement 
alliance. Electoral struggle was considered a deviation from the main issues 
of politicisation and resolving basic demands. The strategy was also 
facilitated by the revival of agrarian populism under Echeverria. New 
resources were made available for rural development projects, reformist 
functionaries proved important allies for nascent regional organisations of 
small producers and the expansion of federal bureaucracy often provided a 
counter-balance to the power wielded by local caciques. Autonomy from 
parties also coincided with that of the new ecclesiastical base communities 
which had emerged, especially in areas of high indigenous population in the 
southern and central states. 
A related criticism of past experience was that leaders tended to become 
divorced from the base and inhibited broad participation. This had not 
happened with the PAOM and Jaramillo, suggesting that a more regionally 
focused organisation had greater chance of reproducing itself over time if 
different political conditions prevailed. However it was the case for most of 
the groups affiliated to the CNC and the official wing of the CCI. At the 
ejido level this critique was not made solely out of a respect for democracy. 
Rather, in some regions, not all, it was linked to the incapacity of leaders to 
resolve basic problems over land, water, services, etc. It is against this 
backdrop that the attempt to construct politically autonomous and decentral-
ised networks of regional peasant organisations should be seen. This is the 
reason why we can call CNPA and UNORCA the main peasant movements 
which make up the new agrarian movement of the 1980s.28 
The Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala (CNPA) 
and the struggle for land 
During the first half of the 1970s new peasant organisations emerged in 
several states in response to the failure of agrarian reform and the increasing 
pressure on the land brought about by the expansion of commercial 
agriculture, cattle ranching and new State-financed projects such as the 
construction of hydroelectricity dams and oil exploration. The high point of 
a revived but limited agrarian reform, Echeverrfa's redistribution of prime 
irrigated land to collective ejidos in Sonora in December 1976, proved to be 
the last of its kind as the new government of Lopez Portillo immediately 
moved to regain the confidence of the private sector. Land invasions, which 
occurred in almost every state in 1975, were no longer to be tolerated and 
met with repression (Bartra, 1980). Between 1976 and 1979 the new 
movements were pushed into a defensive position in which confrontation with 
the government became common. However, each movement began to see the 
need for greater unity at the regional and national levels. 
In 1979, various events were organised to mark the hundreth anniversary 
of the birth of Emiliano Zapata and to discuss the agrarian issue. In March 
a national meeting was held at the Autonomous University of Guerrero, 
attended by representatives from several of the movements engaged in land 
struggles in the states of Oaxaca, Puebla, Veracruz and Guerrero. This 
meeting provided the space for the first contacts to be made between 
organisations and for the exchange of testimonies, ideas and proposals for 
unity. The following month a national gathering of independent movements 
was held in Morelos, called by the Union de Ejidos Emiliano Zapata (UEEZ). 
Two main positions began to emerge. Firstly, to continue the struggle for 
land, despite the government's insistence that agrarian reform had ended. 
Secondly, to oppose the government's plans to take the remains of Zapata 
from Cuautla, Morelos to bury them alongside those of Venustiano Carranza 
at the Monument to the Revolution in Mexico City. This struggle to retain 
popular control over the symbolic importance of Zapata was supported by 
students, teachers and peasants who blockaded the central square of Cuautla 
to prevent the removal of the remains. The struggle also accelerated the 
process of unification of the independent peasant movement. Representatives 
from over forty groups from sixteen states met again in June at the National 
Peasant Meeting organised by the Autonomous University of Chapingo and 
called for the formation of a unified front.29 
In August, one of the organisations calling for such a front, the Movi-
miento Nacional Plan de Ayala (MNPA), invited all participants in the earlier 
meetings to its first national congress.30 Around thirty organisations attended. 
However, the meeting was also attended by representatives of priista 
confederations and formed part of the official celebrations to commemorate 
the life of Zapata. The government's attempt to control the meeting and 
establish a new corporatist pact was rejected by many of the participants. 
In October the first national meeting of independent peasant organisations 
was held in Milpa Alta, on the southern edge of Mexico City. The meeting 
was dominated by a struggle between pro-government organisations, led by 
the son of Zapata, Mateo, and those which favoured an independent position. 
The former argued that it was necessary to support the government's policies 
to provide assistance to small producers in rain-fed regions, which were 
embodied in the SAM. The latter argued that the SAM did not propose any 
solutions to the problem of landlessness and to support it would involve an 
alliance with the State. The independent movements characterised the State 
as their enemy due to their experience of repression in the struggle for land. 
However, the proposals of the officialist groups were rejected by a majority 
which insisted on the continued importance of the land struggle. As a result, 
CNPA was formed on October 14, 1979 with eleven member organisat-
ions.31 The social composition was made up of comuneros, poor peasants, 
land claimants and agricultural workers. This explains why the most 
important issues for CNPA have been the defence of the lands and natural 
resources of indigenous groups and the implementation of agrarian reform. 
It has also fought for recognition of rural unions and the defence of 
indigenous cultures. In more recent years it has given attention to new issues 
which had been neglected, including the need to improve peasant production 
through greater access to credit and increased control over marketing. These 
positions are reflected in the resolutions taken at the first national meeting in 
Milpa Alta (CNPA, 1980). Although its original slogan of 'To-day we 
struggle for land, tomorrow for power' suggests that CNPA was not solely 
limited to sectoral interests, its main concern has always been with achieving 
solutions to the concrete problem of landlessness. By engaging in such 
struggles its member organisations necessarily confronted power relations but 
they did not propose a global strategy for the political transformation of 
Mexico. In this respect, CNPA maintained autonomy from all political parties, 
while allowing individual members freedom to affiliate with whomever they 
wished as long as they did not contradict the principles of CNPA. This 
position was adopted to avoid incorporation into any single party while 
promoting a truly grassroots movement with a peasant leadership and a more 
horizontal and democratic internal structure. It criticised the vertical and 
hierarchical relationships which existed in traditional confederations such as 
the CNC due to the lack of participation from the base. 
The internal structure of CNPA thus emphasised broad participation from 
the grassroots and the rotation of leadership positions. Among some of its re-
gional organisations such practices had already been implemented during the 
1970s.32 A critique of the role of leadership and the form of internal 
organisation had been developed by peasants in alliance with outside advisors, 
including students and teachers. The solution of problems was not seen to be 
the responsibility of advisors or single leaders, but of the whole community 
in which all should participate.33 Starting at this level, the general assemblies 
of member communities elects representatives to a plenary assembly of their 
regional organisation, which in turn elects delegates to the national assembly 
of CNPA. The national assembly elects a permanent commission to reside 
in Mexico City for one year, where it carries out the assembly's resolutions. 
Its work is mainly dedicated to pressing the demands of the member 
organisations with government agencies. It is made up of one representative 
from each member organisation. The national assembly also elects four other 
commissions responsible for press and propaganda, peasant women, relations 
with other organisations and legal advice. The regional organisations similarly 
divide their work among commissions to deal with the specific issues which 
most affect them. 
The second national meeting of CNPA was called by the UCEZ and held 
in Santa Fe de la Laguna, Michoacan, in April 1980. This purepecha 
community had been engaged in a violent struggle in defence of its lands 
against the encroachment of private cattle ranchers. At this meeting the 
government's use of repression against CNPA organisations was denounced 
and it was agreed to give support to the newly formed Frente Nacional 
Contra la Represion (FNCR), which brought together human rights groups 
throughout the country. Institutional violence had the effect of mobilising and 
uniting the independent peasant movement. Following this meeting several of 
the officialist groups left CNPA while new groups joined (Appendix II). In 
November 1980 CNPA held its third national meeting in Tlapacoyan, 
Veracruz at the invitation of the UCI. Once again CNPA rejected the SAM 
and the new Law of Agricultural Development and agreed to organise a 
peasant march to Mexico City to protest against government policy and the 
use of repression. It also agreed to establish closer ties with other movements 
such as the Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Education (CNTE). 
This moment represented the rise of CNPA as an independent and powerful 
social movement. In May 1981 peasants from at least sixteen states joined 
teachers in a march to the Zocalo of the capital city to demand the release 
of imprisoned peasant leaders and the resolution of over three hundred claims 
for land redistribution. In the months following the march repression became 
more common. In July and August CNPA and FNCR organised a hunger 
strike which led to the release of several leaders. Furthermore, the successful 
mobilisation of May 1981 prompted several organisations to join CNPA prior 
to its fourth national meeting, called by COCEI and held in Juchitan, Oaxaca 
in August of that year. Nevertheless, the rapid growth and increasing capacity 
of CNPA to attract support had met with a repressive response which, by 
the end of 1981 had forced it into a defensive position. Differences over 
strategy began to emerge as some organisations pushed for continued national 
mobilisations while others argued that it was necessary to concentrate more 
at the regional level and address problems which had been left unresolved 
due to confrontations with the government. 
In the face of these difficulties CNPA still succeeded in organising its 
second national march in June 1982, although with less support than in the 
previous year. The following month it held its fifth national meeting, hosted 
by the community of Venustiano Carranza, Chiapas, at which a more concrete 
programme was drawn up to include a broader range of demands concerning 
the rights of peasant women and indigenous peoples. Greater attention was 
also given to issues of production, credit and marketing. The document also 
contains a clearly class position in favour of 'social change to destroy 
exploitation and social oppression'. CNPA also changed its slogan to 'To-
day we fight for land and also for power', reflecting the politicisation of its 
economic demands. At this meeting three more groups joined CNPA, taking 
the number of member organisations to nineteen, representing the participa-
tion of ten ethnic groups (Appendix II). 
By 1983 CNPA had developed a capacity for mobilisation far greater than 
its capacity for negotiation. Its actions succeeded in postponing the end of 
land reform, although at a great cost. However, as it admitted at its sixth 
national meeting in Mexico City in September 1983, CNPA could not 
articulate a broad alternative project to the policies of austerity. Instead, the 
member organisations adopted defensive reactions to the impact of austerity 
policies such as the reduction in public spending, the withdrawal of subsidies 
and the decline in guarantee prices. There occurred a 'regionalisation' of the 
peasant movement as each group tried to survive the crisis through mobil-
isation and negotiations at the local and regional level, although national 
marches in the capital continued to be held each April. 
The incorporation of the demands of diverse indigenous groups in the 
CNPA programme also hindered effective national co-ordination. The 
struggles of indigenous communities for respect of rights to land and natural 
resources first had to confront local and regional power structures. In Mexico 
state governments and local level authorities often act in collusion with 
caciques to contain movements with both a class and an ethnic dimension. As 
a result, the vulnerability of CNPA as a national movement was in large part 
due to the vulnerability to repression of its regional member organisations. 
This lesson was learnt by 1985 as CNPA members began to concentrate their 
efforts on building mass-based movements within their own regions and 
states. The time-consutning work of national co-ordination became an 
increasing burden for several organisations which were overstretched 
financially and in terms of the number of prominent activists they could count 
on. Consequently, the impact of CNPA has been felt most at the regional 
level by challenging deep-rooted structures of caciquismo. It is also at the 
regional level that CNPA has achieved its greatest degree of articulation with 
other social movements, particulary those representing the interests of school 
teachers, students and the urban poor.34 
An example of the problems facing CNPA is the experience of the 
Organization Campesina Emiliano Zapata (OCEZ) of Chiapas, formed in 
1982.35 The most important group in the formation of the OCEZ was the 
tzotzil community of Venustiano Carranza. Located in the fertile Central 
Valleys, this community lost control of important extensions of communal 
land to the encroachment of cattle ranches, the formation of new ejidos and, 
in the early 1970s, the construction of the Angostura hydroelectricity dam. In 
the struggle to reclaim land from local ranchers four of the community's 
leaders were assassinated between 1966 and 1971. Tired of using the legal 
channels, a new generation of leaders who had made contact with radical 
student groups began to promote a dual strategy of mobilisation with 
negotiations. The capacity for mobilisation worried the local ranching families 
and the municipal and state governments moved quickly to repress the 
opposition. By 1979 the.CNC had created a serious split by drawing some 
support away from the struggle for land in favour of a closer relationship 
with the government. 
The land claimants, organised as the Casa del Pueblo, remained indepen-
dent and continued to demand the restitution of over 3,000 hectares of 
communal land held illegally by private ranchers. The struggle continued, 
now characterised by violent attacks led by the CNC group against the 
independent movement. As in many land conflicts throughout Mexico, what 
were originally economic demands were quickly politicised as the SRA made 
resolution of the problem conditional on the community's affiliation to the 
CNC. When such conditions were rejected, violence and intimidation were 
used. In 1980 two members of the Casa del Pueblo were killed, while another 
three leaders were arrested and imprisoned in April 1981. 
Repression of the peasant movement in Venustiano Carranza was a co-
ordinated and politically-motivated response of entrenched local interests. The 
aim was to eliminate the opposition and undermine its regional importance. 
By 1980 the Casa del Pueblo was a focal point for other discontented peasant 
groups, providing the nucleus of the Coordinadora Provisional de Chiapas, 
a state-wide network of land-claimant groups designed to promote joint 
mobilisations. The confrontation came to a head around the issue of 
democratic elections of community representatives. The CNC attempted to 
impose its own candidate for comisariado de bienes comunales (president of 
communal lands) in the elections of May 1980. At such elections the only 
officials required to attend are usually delegates of the SRA. This meeting, 
however, was attended by the state governor, the state representative of the 
SRA, the commander of the 31st Military Zone, local PRI deputies, judicial 
police, members of the CNC group and people from outside Carranza. 
In response, the Casa del Pueblo filed an injunction against the legality of 
the election and succeeded in frustrating the efforts to impose a CNC 
candidate. At the same time, it issued an ultimatum to the CNC supporters 
that they had two months in which to comply with their duty to work 
communal lands as community members and not as private owners, invoking 
Article 87 of the Federal Agrarian Reform Law. In the ensuing months 
violent clashes between the two rival groups became more frequent and in 
July 1980 a curfew was imposed on the town by state governor Juan Sabines. 
In the same month the negotiating commission of the Casa del Pueblo was 
held for over ten hours by municipal authorities and its leader forced to sign 
a document agreeing to hand over all lands and call new elections. Once 
again an injunction was successfully filed against the document's legality. 
Nevertheless, during the second half of 1980 and in the run-up to elections 
scheduled for May 1981 supporters of the Casa del Pueblo were constantly 
threatened with arrest orders. 
In another attack by the CNC group in March 1981 one of the assailants 
was killed. This provided a pretext to blame the Casa del Pueblo and 
eliminate three of its most important activists prior to the May elections by 
imprisoning them on murder charges. In April, Arturo Albores, Victorico 
Martinez and Ciro Coello were arrested and, against their constitutional 
rights, were held incommunicado for two days during which time they were 
allegedly beaten and tortured.36 Despite the concerted pressure against it, the 
Casa del Pueblo succeeded in retaining the post of comisariado in the May 
elections. However, the authorities refused to recognise the election since no 
representative from the SRA was present. Repression continued throughout 
1981 with some forty arrest orders made out against supporters of the 
independent movement. The release of prisoners was made conditional on 
several factors, including the acceptance of the division of communal lands, 
affiliation to the CNC and the withdrawal from Chiapas of Albores and 
Martinez. Such conditions were clearly unacceptable to the community which 
continued to press for their unconditional release. A further wave of arrests 
in February 1982 led to another march and demonstration in the state capital, 
Tuxtla Gutierrez, which was halted by the army. Another prominent activist, 
Agustfn de la Torre, was arrested and imprisoned. 
By the end of 1982 the movement in Carranza was not defeated but was 
certainly on the defensive. Its decision to join CNPA and to promote a state-
wide peasant movement (the OCEZ) were taken in response to its vulnerable 
position within the local power structure. It is likely that such was the case 
for other regional movements seeking to break out from their isolation and 
establish links of solidarity and mutual support through CNPA. However, 
when it became apparent that CNPA was unable to win effective solutions 
through national co-ordination, groups such as the OCEZ emphasised the need 
to build broad-based regional movements. 
As a result, levels of participation in the CNPA structure declined after 
1984. However, within Chiapas, the OCEZ spread to include new groups and 
demands, including peasants claiming compensation for damages to crop land 
caused by oil exploration. Between 1982 and 1987 it won the release of its 
imprisoned leaders and in 1990 the Casa del Pueblo of Venustiano Carranza 
was finally granted possession of the lands which it had disputed with 
ranchers. It also promoted politicisation through annual cultural events in 
various parts of the state. 
Nevertheless, as the OCEZ spread so did internal divisions as leaders 
differed over strategy and relations with the government. The state govern-
ment of General Absalon Castellanos Domfnguez (1982-88) was characterised 
by the frequent use of repression against almost all forms of political 
opposition in Chiapas. In 1984 nine members of the Casa del Pueblo were 
killed in an ambush by supporters of the CNC, while mass demonstrations in 
July and October 1985 at the palace of state government were violently 
broken up. Peasant groups such as the Casa del Pueblo were thus sceptical 
of promises made by the new state governor, Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido, 
and President Salinas de Gortari that their demands would be listened to and 
resolved through negotiations. When one faction of the OCEZ welcomed this 
change of approach, another, more radical wing insisted on making no deals 
which would compromise the movement's autonomy. In effect, this difference 
of opinion was due to the possibilities for negotiated solutions in each 
location. OCEZ leaders in each area followed the path which mos.t suited 
the interests of each particular group and hence their own position as leaders. 
In 1988 a deep division occurred as a radical wing confronted a more 
pragmatic current, leaving the OCEZ internally weakened and unable to 
present a common front in defence of peasant communities. Regionalisation 
is accompanied, in the case of the OCEZ, by fragmentation, division and 
confrontation. 
Regionalisation was also a result of local differences concerning alliances 
with political parties. The trotskyist Partido Revolucionario de los Trabaja-
dores (PRT) was the most important party in CNPA, due to its alliance with 
the CCRI which co-ordinates the struggle for land in areas of Veracruz, 
Guerrero, Coahuila and Sonora. In the context of the 1985 federal elections 
the CCRI was accused of trying to manipulate CNPA in favour of PRT 
candidates, which provoked a serious split in which the UCEZ, ACR and 
OIPUH left. Although the latter two rejoined CNPA, the UCEZ remained 
independent. This was a considerable loss as it was one of the strongest 
members. The OCEZ was also highly critical of the role played by the PRT 
but decided to continue within CNPA. 
Further divisions followed as CNPA proved incapable of taking on new 
demands beyond that of land reform. In 1985 and 1986 five organisations 
left: the CDP de Chihuahua, COCEI, COMA, CCRI and OPA. The latter two 
joined with the PRT to form the UGOCP, while the COCEI established an 
alliance with the PSUM. It appears that the increasing importance of electoral 
contests in Mexican politics passed CNPA by. The dominant current which 
remained (which included the OCEZ) continued to see elections as simply 'a 
bourgeois game' and attacked those which supported parties as 'reformist'.37 
The greatest strength of CNPA in 1979, its independence from political 
parties and its clear class position, turned out to be its greatest weakness in 
a very different political conjuncture, that of the presidential elections of 
1988. It had failed to appreciate the importance of the changes which had 
been occurring in the political system and most of its member organisations 
refused to mobilise support for the candidacy of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas. As 
Hernandez argues, the radical and confrontational tone of CNPA was out of 
step with its real capabilities in the context of economic crisis and re-
pression.38 Discontent within the movement led several groups to concentrate 
their efforts in their own regions and abandon national co-ordination. Still 
others looked to new alliances with political parties of the left as the electoral 
struggles became more important. Similarly, the radicalisation of CNPA has 
reduced its capacity for negotiations with the State, impeding the resolution 
of basic demands. Although this was partly due to the use of repression in 
the countryside, CNPA had not shown the capacity to use the State in the 
same way as UNORCA had.39 Although in 1989 eighteen organisations from 
fifteen states continued to participate in CNPA (see map), the levels of 
participation varied greatly and the trend towards regionalisation had not been 
reversed. 
At its national meeting in August 1989 several member organisations 
openly expressed their discontent with the evolution of CNPA. The demo-
cratic practices which had distinguished the internal structure of the 
coordinadora had fallen into disuse, participation was not being promoted, 
analysis of the current national situation was lacking and no strategic plan 
had been elaborated. The root of the problem was held to be the political 
immaturity and intolerance of the most sectarian organisations. This critical 
current calls for the recovery of the positive aspects of CNPA, primarily its 
earlier democratic form of internal organisation and promotion of broad 
participation. It also recognises that CNPA is now just one among several 
peasant movements. After its rapid growth between 1979 and 1982, it entered 
into decline and has since been overtaken by other organisations, particu-
larly UNORCA, and by the popularity of neocardenismo. If CNPA is to 
survive, therefore, its future lies in co-operation with these new movements. 
This does not necessarily imply a loss of its identity, but simply a willingness 
to co-ordinate its own actions with those of other groups. If it takes this path, 
CNPA will have much to offer in the struggle for social, economic and 
political change in rural Mexico. 

Peasant appropriation of the productive process: 
the Union Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales 
Campesinas Autonomas (UNORCA) 
Whereas CNPA has maintained a radical stance in defence of its demands for 
land reform, most organisations have opted for less confrontational tactics 
and have instead actively sought support from the government for their 
proposals. This pragmatic strategy has been clearly illustrated by the 
development of the struggle to control decisions relating to production and 
marketing. The shift was due to a relative opening towards non-PRI producer 
organisations on the part of the government after 1979 and a correspondingly 
conciliatory strategy promoted by Linea Proletaria (LP). 
The most important experiences to understand the action of LP in the 
countryside are those of the Coalition de Ejidos Colectivos de los Valles 
Yaqui y Mayo (CECVYM) and the Union de Uniones Ejidales y Grupos 
Campesinos Solidarios de Chiapas (UU). Following the land redistribution in 
the Yaqui and Mayo Valleys in December 1976, pro-government organisa-
tions lost their support when they signed an agreement with the Banco 
Nacional de Credito Rural (BANRURAL) to pay compensation to the former 
landowners. The agreement also stipulated that areas of expropriated land 
which contained buildings or infrastructure should be returned to their former 
owners. In response the new ejidatarios protested by occupying the offices 
of BANRURAL and forced the bank to reverse its decisions. This initial 
victory gave rise to the formation of the independent Coalition. In subsequent 
years the CECVYM fought against corruption, inefficiency and clientelism 
which characterised BANRURAL and the state-owned crop insurance 
company, Aseguradora Nacional Agricola y Ganadera (ANAGSA). In 1978 
dependency on ANAGSA was overcome through the establishment of a 
common fund into which all member ejidos paid. The fund allowed for the 
creation of departments of technical assistance and seed reproduction, thereby 
overcoming the problems created by the corruption of government function-
aries. BANRURAL threatened to suspend the payment of credit to those who 
refused to insure their crops with ANAGSA. In its confrontations with 
BANRURAL the Coalition saw the need to gain greater financial indepen-
dence through the establishment of its own credit union. By October 1980 
the Union of Ejido Credit of the Yaqui and Mayo Valley was established, 
constituting a further break in the chain of intermediaries. At the same time 
the Coalition set up its own marketing commission to work in conjunction 
with the credit union. The objective was to take greater control of decisions 
relating to production and marketing: 
'the marketing commission was set up with the aim of gaining indepen-
dence from the control of the marketing committee of BANRURAL with 
whom we had to deal prior to the formation of the credit union. Now we 
can make our own decisions regarding the sale of our production, unlike 
before when just two or three people who signed the agreements decided 
for us.'40 
The objective of the LP activists in the Coalition was to build a viable 
economic organisation in which the direct producers would have control over 
the decisions affecting their lives. The Coalition concentrated on each area 
of economic decision-making, from crop insurance to credit and marketing 
and instituted a series of projects in technical assistance, training, social 
welfare and housing. Its success attracted the interest of other producer 
organisations with similar problems, including the Union de Uniones of 
Chiapas (UU). 
The UU was formed in September 1980, representing almost 10,000 
families from ten municipalities. It began with the work of activists belonging 
to Politica Popular in the mid-1970s who oriented the struggle for land and 
control of coffee marketing in the Lacandon forest area. After 1978 the 
marketing issue was seen as the priority as it would not involve confrontation 
with the government. The shift from radicalism to pragmatism began when 
the government of Lopez Portillo implemented a policy of repression against 
land-claimant groups after 1976. The LP considered that the balance of forces 
was against the continued struggle for land and it was necessary to adopt a 
more conciliatory position. This strategy could take advantage of a relative 
opening to producer organisations on the part of federal government. The 
introduction of new SAM subsidies in 1980-82 allowed organisations such as 
the UU a greater margin of manoeuvre, although it would tie it closer to 
State agencies. Its main aims were thus economic, although, according to its 
advisers, advances in the sphere of production should be accompanied by 
the emergence of new social actors: 
'we should use the transformation of our production system to overcome 
paternalism - to discuss different systems of maize and coffee production, 
to begin to form a new type of producer who is capable of taking 
initiatives, is responsible, with a better quality in life and work and not 
conformist, dependent, irresponsible and dominated'.41 
In 1982, the UU won a concession from the National Banking Commission 
to set up its credit union to operate with 125 million pesos. Each member of 
its 156 ejidos contributed 2,000 pesos towards the necessary start-up capital 
of 25 million pesos. The credit union was seen as a solution to the effects of 
the crisis yet it produced a new set of problems for the UU. Firstly, the speed 
with which the credit union was set up meant that decision-making was 
concentrated in the hands of a few advisers with close links to government 
agencies. Accusations that the union's democratic form of decision-making 
had been by-passed led to a serious split in 1983.42 
Secondly, with the on-set of the economic crisis in 1982, the LP proposed 
a change of tactics ('cambio de terreno') which explains the defensive 
pragmatism of the subsequent period. For the UU, confrontation with the 
government was rejected in favour of negotiations. This stance distanced the 
UU from the more radical groups affiliated to CNPA, such as the OCEZ of 
Chiapas. Despite the common problems faced by these organisations, unity 
was not possible due to their divergent strategies. 
The capacity of some peasant movements to use the State was clearly seen 
in the struggle of migrant colonists to retain control of land in the Lacandon 
forest area of eastern Chiapas. These communities of chol and tzeltal Indians, 
organised in 1975 as the Union de Ejidos 'Quiptic Ta Lecubcel' ('Union is 
Strength' in tzeltal), had split from the UU in 1983 due to the way in which 
the credit union was set up.43 Despite gaining assurances in 1981 from the 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (SRA) that eviction orders would be withdrawn, 
local logging interests with close ties to the state governor acted to block any 
resolution of the problem. The Quiptic responded by seeking support from 
federal government for its proposals to conserve the Lacandon forest and thus 
isolate the position of the local authorities. By 1986 there was increasing 
concern over the ecological destruction of the forest. Some ecologists blamed 
the slash and burn technique of colonists as the main cause of the damage. 
The Quiptic, using the press and forums such as the South-eastern Centre for 
Ecological Research in Chiapas, argued that its members were forced to 
cultivate more land because they lacked the technical and financial support 
to increase production on the lands they already had. This support was 
lacking because the SRA had refused to give definitive titles to the commun-
ities in question. In this way, the prevention of ecological crisis was made 
dependent on security of land tenure. The leaders of the Quiptic took this 
proposal to the Ministers of Planning and Budgets (SPP), Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari, and Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE), Manuel Camacho 
Solis: 
'In June 1986 we asked for talks with Salinas and Camacho. Salinas told 
us that the government was very concerned that the problem of land tenure 
in the Lacandon forest had still not been resolved and that he was pleased 
that we had informed him of our situation and that he saw we were willing 
to resolve the matter. Similarly, Camacho gave a favourable response to 
our proposals. He immediately set up a commission for the Lacandon 
forest and organised a meeting for October 1986 with the governor, Castel-
lanos Domfnguez, SRA, SARH and the Quiptic. He also published an 
official letter recognising our land rights. In this way we could overcome 
the governor's opposition. He had a personal stake in exploiting the forest 
and he did not like SEDUE promoting our demands. But he could not 
oppose the conservation of the forest, it is a very important issue now, and 
unwillingly he gave his support to SEDUE. We have a good relationship 
with Camacho and this isolates the governor. We knew how to weaken the 
enemy and now the balance of forces favours us.'44 
The experiences of regional organisations such as the CECVYM, UU and 
the Quiptic have been important in the emergence of UNORCA. UNORCA 
was formed in March 1985 following various meetings to unify regional 
movements which had not found an adequate response to their demands from 
the existing official or independent organisations. Significantly, the formation 
of UNORCA underlined the weakness of CNPA by this time to articulate 
demands other than that of land reform. This moment would thus mark the 
rise of UNORCA as a new social movement in the countryside and the 
accompanying decline of CNPA. It grew from twenty-six member organisa-
tions in 1985 to seventy-three by 1989, with a presence in twenty-one states.45 
In its first bulletin UNORCA states that it is a network of autonomous 
peasant organisations. Since it is a network, it is not affiliated to any single 
party but respects the autonomy of each group to support the party it wishes. 
It thus includes currents which support both the PRI and the PRD. However, 
its orientation is firmly social and not political. That is, its aim is to struggle 
for the social and economic development of the ejidos and regions in which 
it operates. It has drawn on the experience of member organisations by 
putting the solution of material and economic problems before ideological 
struggles. Its alliances are similarly limited to the peasant sector. This 
position is different from the anti-party stance of CNPA, since it does not 
explicitly criticise party affiliation. However, it is critical of the vertical and 
centralised structures of traditional peasant confederations which 'belong' to 
political parties. Like CNPA, it has developed a more horizontal form of 
organisation. Assemblies elect local representatives to act within commissions 
of the regional organisations. Regional representatives are also elected to the 
national co-ordinating committee which in turn elects a permanent commis-
sion of four members and a general assembly of representatives from each 
member group. 
The political strategy of UNORCA reflects the cambio de terreno which 
had been promoted by the LP. Rather than confront the State with an 
intransigent position, UNORCA has emphasised the need to use the State as 
far as possible to the advantage of its members. As a result, political struggle 
is used only to address concrete problems: 
Tf we have to be political then it should be in order to solve our problems 
with credit, guarantee prices, housing, etc.'46 
The predominance of economic over political concerns can be interpreted 
as a response to the effects of the crisis in the countryside. Immediate 
problems of production and marketing became the priority. At the same time, 
the withdrawal of the State from its traditional functions meant that new 
spaces were being left which producer organisations could fill. This helps 
explain the government's interest in cultivating good relations with the 
UNORCA-affiliated groups whose proposals began to be seen as necessary 
for reducing the impact of the crisis. In particular, there has been a 
willingness of the federal government to recognise the capacity of the more 
developed organisations within UNORCA to take greater control of 
production and marketing. 
Nevertheless, tensions with the government were inevitable given the 
severity of the crisis and the austerity policies which were adopted. As noted 
above, decapitalisation has been seen in the reduction of the amount of credit 
and public investment dedicated to agriculture. The worsening terms of 
exchange for peasant producers was exacerbated by the rising costs for 
fertilisers, electricity, machinery and improved seeds. The groups most 
affected have been peasant producers of basic grains who depend on 
guarantee prices. As a result, between 1982 and 1986 the value in real terms 
of these prices fell by 43 per cent for maize, 52 per cent for beans, 62 per 
cent for wheat and 23 per cent for rice.47 
The issue which led to greatest unrest was the negotiation of guarantee 
prices for basic grains. Interestingly, UNORCA-affiliated groups brought 
together independent and official organisations for the first time around this 
common issue. Since 1983 protests have occurred throughout the country as 
peasants blockaded roads and occupied warehouses of the state-owned 
subsidised food company, Companfa Nacional de Subsistencias Populares 
(CONASUPO). In 1986 small and medium producers belonging to the 
Alianza Campesina del Noroeste (ALCANO) organised mass blockades in 
Chihuahua to prevent the movement of maize from CONASUPO warehouses. 
The protests spread to the southern part of the state as over twenty thousand 
peasants of different affiliations joined the Movimiento Democratico Campe-
sino de Chihuahua (MDC). They peacefully occupied sixty-nine warehouses 
and their bargaining position was strengthened by the forthcoming elections 
for state governor, which reduced the likelihood of a repressive response. As 
a result, the MDC won a price increase of 15 per cent for Chihuahua maize 
producers.48 
Nevertheless, similar protests in other states in 1986 did not have the same 
effect, due to local political conditions. For example, in Nayarit, a UNORCA-
affiliated movement also combined direct action (including the occupation of 
warehouses and road blockades) with negotiations but, in the absence of the 
leverage provided by elections, received a smaller increase. In Chiapas, over 
thirty thousand maize growers led by German Jimenez, a former CNC leader 
in the state, occupied fifty-four CONASUPO warehouses. When the state 
government refused to meet demands, a contingent blockaded the Pan-
American Highway, prompting the army to intervene and remove the 
protesters. Jimenez and five others were imprisoned as a result, reflecting the 
personal rivalry with governor Castellanos Dominguez and the traditional use 
of repression against protest movements in the state (Hernandez Aguilar, 
1986). 
A new wave of peasant protest would emerge in response to the announce-
ment in December 1987 of the Pact of Economic Solidarity (PSE), which was 
introduced to control spiralling inflation through wage and price freezes. For 
the agricultural sector the PSE measures included an immediate rise in the 
cost of necessary inputs as subsidies were withdrawn, while guarantee prices 
were kept at their 1987 level.49 
Cardenas, Salinas and the new agrarian movement 
Protests over guarantee prices in 1988 and 1989 became increasingly 
politicised as the appearance of the Cardenas movement threatened to pull 
electoral support away from the PRI. Traditionally the rural vote in Mexico 
has been controlled by the PRI. High rates of abstentionism, combined with 
the transporting of voters to polling stations and the hand-out of presents to 
CNC-loyalists have been common practices. Where opposition candidates 
have stood the PRI has not hesitated to use fraud to secure its victories. 
Furthermore, as we have seen with CNPA and UNORCA, independent 
peasant movements usually abstained from electoral politics, suspicious of the 
motives of opposition parties. 
The elections of July 1988 marked a significant challenge to the PRI in 
several rural areas, although the official candidate would eventually claim 
victory on the basis of the rural vote. Victories for the Frente Democratico 
Nacional (FDN) and the Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN) were concen-
trated mainly in the most modern, urban sectors, suggesting a desertion of 
middle-class voters from the PRI and the support of some important social 
organisations such as the student and urban popular movements. Nevertheless, 
the elections were highly contested in several rural states, suggesting a 
significant shift in political behaviour. 
In fact, support for Cardenas's candidacy took off following his visit in 
February 1988 to the Laguna region which straddles Coahuila and Durango. 
Here, due to their discontent with government policies, corruption and 
declining incomes, ejidatarios gave a hero's welcome to Cardenas, in contrast 
to the protests seen when Salinas visited the region. These ejidatarios had 
benefited from the massive land redistribution carried out by the father of 
Cuauhtemoc, Lazaro Cardenas, in the 1930s. More importantly, thousands of 
CNC members deserted to the rival Central Campesina Cardenista (CCC) and 
pledged their support to Cardenas in the July elections.50 
Cardenas was also well received in areas with a long tradition of agrarian 
struggle, such as parts of Michoacan, the mixteca region of Oaxaca, Morelos 
and southern Veracruz. Peasants were responding not simply to the mythical 
figure of Lazaro Cardenas but to what they perceived as an alternative to the 
damaging policies of the out-going administration. Cardenas's programme for 
the countryside included the demand for the distribution of five million 
hectares which are still subject to expropriation and support for the political 
protection and economic development of the social sector.513 
Nevertheless, fraud was easier to carry out in the countryside than in the 
cities where opposition parties had a greater capacity for vigilance. One week 
after the polls and the infamous break-down of the federal electoral 
commission's computer system, the government announced that the PRI 
candidate, Salinas de Gortari, had won 50.36 per cent of the vote, defeating 
Cardenas's vote of 31.12 per cent and the PAN's 17.07 per cent. However, 
the opposition cried fraud and demanded that the government make public all 
ballots and polling station returns for scrutiny. In fact, only 55 per cent of the 
55,000 returns were made public. 
The unreliability of the official figures makes any analysis of the peasant 
vote hazardous. Given this fact, it is surprising that many commentators 
concluded that, despite the negative impact of the government's policies, it 
was the peasantry which won the presidency for Salinas. A study of the 
figures for over 10,000 voting booths in one hundred rural districts suggests 
that it was in the countryside that the PRI vote was most inflated (Lopez 
Monjardfn, 1990). Similarly, according to calculations made by the Partido 
Mexicano Socialista (PMS), the vote for Salinas was inflated by 2.2 million 
while another 1.5 million were subtracted from Cardenas's tally (Zarate, 
1988). Significantly, 1.1 million of Cardenas's lost vote occurred in states 
with large rural populations (Veracruz, Guerrero, Michoacan, Chiapas, 
Oaxaca, Puebla and Coahuila). 
In the protests which followed, the major opposition candidates called for 
an annulment of the elections and were supported by large demonstrations in 
major cities. However, Salinas succeeded in gaining ratification in September 
and was inaugurated as President on 1 December. He had won, but without 
convincing the public of the legitimacy of his victory. However, the Cardenas 
camp decided to take up its seats in the Chamber of Deputies rather than 
insist on a mass campaign of civil disobedience. Nevertheless, protests 
continued in the countryside as local groups of cardenistas did engage in civil 
disobedience in demand of respect for the vote. Rural discontent was fuelled 
by the continued reliance on fraud in elections for state legislatures and 
municipal presidents in the Autumn of 1988 and since July 1989. Long-
standing claims against the corruption of municipal authorities found 
expression in support for the cardenista movement. For example, the 
UNORCA-affiliated Union of Ejidos of the Costa Chica of Guerrero, which 
supported Cardenas in July 1988, has participated in protests against electoral 
fraud in its region. One of the most important demands is for the dismissal 
of municipal presidents on charges of inexplicable enrichment. A survey of 
the national press between December 1988 and July 1989 shows that pro-
Cardenas peasant groups continued to denounce electoral fraud and participate 
in direct action, including the occupation of municipal presidencies, in at least 
eleven states: Tabasco, Veracruz, Chiapas, Morelos, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosi, 
Hidalgo, Guerrero, Durango, Puebla and Michoacan. 
However, the sudden emergence of elections as the central arena of 
political struggle was something for which neither CNPA nor UNORCA were 
fully prepared. The result was that, despite the negative impact of the crisis 
in the countryside, Salinas could claim victory on the basis of an overwhelm-
ing majority in rural districts. Both organisations have thus been challenged 
by the emergence of neocardenismo to which they must now respond. Rather 
than forming a separate strategy, participation in elections may well form 
another front of struggle with which peasant movements can advance. Indeed, 
the limitations of defensive strategies and new linkages with the State may 
require such a solution. 
Due to the lack of credibility surrounding his victory, Salinas acted quickly 
to neutralise the opposition. In the countryside, two strategies have been 
deployed. Firstly, the signing of new negotiated agreements, convenios de 
concertacidn, with independent movements and, secondly, the promotion of 
a new umbrella organisation known as the Congreso Agrario Permanente 
(CAP). Within the first three months of 1989 SARH officials rushed to the 
countryside to sign ten convenios with sixty-six organisations in eighteen 
states. The targeted groups included many of those affiliated to UNORCA. 
At the same time, Salinas made several speeches in which he emphasised the 
need to respect the autonomy of peasant organisations and to leave behind the 
traditional paternalism of the State. 
On 6 January 1989, during the ceremony to commemorate Carranza's 1915 
agrarian reform law, he said that the time had come to recognise the maturity 
of the peasant organisations, to let them control the use of credit, fertilisers 
and inputs. He proposed a new role for the State in which functions and 
resources would be transferred to the producer organisations, reflecting a 
demand of UNORCA, while maintaining its responsibilities. These ideas, 
which appear to have come from Gordillo, were incorporated into official 
statements of policy, including the National Development Plan (PND) for 
1989-94. 
Under the sub-heading 'Modernisation of the Countryside', the government 
affirms its emphasis on negotiated agreements, or concertacidn. It says that 
there will be a decentralisation of resources and functions to the states; a 
strengthening of the autonomous character of producers and their organisa-
tions; co-operation with state governments and producer organisations to 
formulate and implement rural development programmes to make more 
rational use of local and federal resources; and a firm policy to promote 
efficiency in production. In sum, concertacidn would require the modernis-
ation of relations between State and peasantry in which the authorities would 
cease to exercise 'any form of anachronistic and corrupt tutelage'. The PND 
also speaks of associations between private capital and peasants, in an attempt 
to attract desperately needed investment, and a thorough decentralisation of 
resources to state governments and producers. 
At the same time, pressure was being applied on the CNC to reform and 
modernise its structures. At an Extraordinary General Congress of the CNC 
in May 1989 the chairperson of the PRI, Luis Donaldo Colosio, recognised 
that old practices no longer worked and were rejected by the rank-and-file 
and called on the state leaders for proposals to hold democratic elections of 
agrarian committees. Colosio added that 'democratisation will allow us to 
transform old cacicazgos and imposition into forms of honest, honourable and 
legitimate co-ordination at the service of the interests of the rural popula-
tion'.52 The members demanded a greater level of participation in all electoral 
processes through a direct vote, while the CNC leader in Chiapas, Mario 
Albero Manzano, warned that 'we have lost contact with the peasant base'.53 
It is thus significant that one of the most important impacts of independent 
movements has been to force the CNC to appreciate the need for its own 
democratisation. 
The second strand of Salinas's strategy was the creation of the CAP. 
Previous governments had attempted without success to unify peasant 
movements in a common front but had failed, largely because the decision 
was not taken at the base and the independent organisations were excluded. 
The government now had to respect the presence of several independent 
movements if such an alliance was to succeed. In fact, Salinas had to respond 
to the recent unification of all major independent movements in December 
1988 when ten organisations signed the Convenio de Action Unitaria (CAU). 
These included groups which can be broadly categorised as left-wing or pro-
Cardenas. The signing of the CAU was based on the following demands: 
(i) increased share of the federal budget for agriculture; 
(ii) fairer guarantee prices; 
(iii) participation of peasant organisations in the decision-making 
apparatus of State agencies operating in the countryside; 
(iv) reduction in the size of private holdings and the abolition of 
certificates protecting landowners from expropriation; 
(v) an end to repression and respect for human rights; 
(vi) respect for democratic rights; 
(vii) respect for the rights of indigenous peoples and seasonal 
workers. 
At the prompting of Salinas, the CNC responded by calling for the 
formation of a broader front, to include itself and other official organisations. 
In January 1989 a committee was set up to organise the founding congress 
of the CAP with two representatives of the ten organisations which supported 
the new proposal. These included six groups which had signed the CAU 
agreement (UGOCP, CIOAC, CCC, UNTA, CODUC and UNORCA) and five 
official organisations (CNC, CCI, CAM, MNCP and UGOCM). Four 
signatories of the CAU did not join in the CAP, while the Alianza Campe-
sina del Noroeste (ALCANO) joined at a later stage (Table 1). 
Table 1 
Members of the CAP 
UGOCP 
CIOAC 
CCC 
UNTA 
CODUC 
UNORCA 
CNC 
CCI 
CAM 
MNCP 
ALCANO 
UGOCM 
Among the organisations which refused to join the CAP, the most 
important, due to its national presence, was CNPA. CNPA preferred observer 
status only, arguing for an end to repression against its leaders before 
participating in such a forum. During the first three months of the Salinas 
administration over thirty peasants belonging to independent organisations 
were murdered, reflecting a darker side of concertacion and a continuation 
of harassment of opposition social movements.54 
However, most organisations saw the CAP as an opportunity to present 
their demands and proposals and influence the shape of agrarian policy. In 
April 1989 Salinas responded by inviting the CAP to make proposals for the 
National Plan for Agrarian Co-operation. At the end of May the constituent 
assembly of the CAP was held at which the positions of the CAU were 
reiterated, including the reduction in size of private holdings and the demand 
for full peasant participation in decision-making. It also called for the 
dissolution of the government's cabinet on agriculture, which was accused 
of promoting privatisation in the reform sector. As a result, it appeared to 
take a radical and independent line towards the government and the interests 
of private landowners. The participation of the UGOCP, CIOAC and 
UNORCA was therefore important in that they gained support for long-
standing demands of the independent organisations. 
Signatories of the CAU 
UGOCP 
CIOAC 
CCC 
UNTA 
CODUC 
UNORCA 
CNPA 
CNPI 
FDCCh 
MNPA 
Nevertheless, there are several problems with the CAP which must be 
mentioned. The first concerns its position on the broader economic policies 
of the government. Although the CAP may provide a counter-balance to the 
CNA, on issues such as debt repayments and macro-economic policy there 
are profound differences between the member organisations. Thus, an early 
source of tension for the CAP was the decision of the CNC to sign the 
extension of the Pact for Stability and Economic Growth (PECE) in June 
1989. Other members of the CAP were highly critical of the effects which 
the PECE has had due to the freezing of prices for agricultural goods and the 
deterioration of rural wages. Just as in December 1987 when the PSE was 
introduced, the independent movements claimed that the signing was done 
without the consent of the majority of peasants, reflecting the continued 
subservience of the CNC to the government. In July further doubts over the 
possibilities of the CAP were raised by government plans to abolish 
guarantee prices and the continued use of repression in the countryside. 
At the same time, the leadership of the CCC had formally broken off its 
support for Cardenas in favour of closer relations with the Salinas govern-
ment. The CCC had been mainly organised by the Partido del Frente 
Cardenista de Reconstruction Nacional (PFCRN).55 In early 1989 the leaders 
of the PFCRN and CCC, Rafael Aguilar Talamantes and Jorge Amador 
Amador, entered into negotiations with Salinas and were present at the 
official celebrations to commemorate the 51st anniversary of the nationalisa-
tion of the oil industry. This rapprochement was severely criticised by 
Cardenas and the PFCRN refused to participate in the formation of the PRD 
in May 1989. It remained independent, attacking the PRD leadership as 
'opportunists'. Nevertheless, the break with Cardenas was not entirely popular 
with the members of the CCC, who denounced the deceitful way in which 
their national leaders had manipulated the organisation to their own benefit 
and that of the government. This conflict was most evident in the Laguna and 
Michoacan, prompting Cardenas to call for a new peasant confederation to be 
affiliated to the PRD. As a result, since August 1989 the PRD has been 
promoting a new umbrella organisation, the Central Campesina Unitaria 
(CCU), which aims to overcome the weaknesses of the CAU and the 
ambiguities of the CAP. It received initial support from pro-Cardenas 
currents in the CCC, UNORCA, UGOCP, CIO AC, the Coordinadora Nacional 
de Pueblos Indigenas (CNPI) and some smaller, regional organisations. 
However, the CAP has proved to be the most attractive of the three initiat-
ives as those groups who have not joined are marginalised in the distribution 
of resources. 
Several observers are thus wary of the neo-corporatist tendencies of the 
CAP and the extent to which the government is committed to implementing 
a policy of concertacion. Such a policy would necessarily lead it into 
confrontation with the private sector, which is actively calling for privatis-
ation of ejidos. It also contradicts the government's commitments to the 
World Bank. In February 1988 the SARH signed an agreement with the 
World Bank for a US$300 million loan. The conditions tied to the loan 
included privatisation of State-owned companies, increases in the cost of 
credit and withdrawal of subsidies for irrigation and fertilisers. Rendon and 
Escalante remark that the government's formulation of agrarian policy has 
thus been conditioned by what is a relatively small amount of money.56 
Neither this agreement, nor a subsequent World Bank loan of US$500 million 
in 1989, contained incentives for most small producers in the decapitalised 
rain-fed regions. In fact, the groups most likely to benefit are private agro-
exporters in the more developed regions. As Robles and Moguel argue, such 
a policy is likely to deepen social and regional inequalities.57 
In this sense, Sarmiento argues that the effectiveness of the CAP is 
dependent not only on its capacity to propose alternative policies, but 
crucially on the willingness of the government to end repression, release 
imprisoned peasant leaders, control local caciques, provide economic support 
to ejidos and indigenous communities and show respect for the vote.58 This 
last issue appears to be the most difficult for the government to accept and 
is another limit to concertacidn. Similarly, Garcia argues that: 
'neither concertacidn nor pluralism defines the relations between the State 
and peasantry to-day. Alongside the speeches in favour of concertacidn is 
the constant presence of repression, the refusal to solve years-old demands 
for land and the corporatist goals of the State.'59 
Gordillo also recognises the difficulties of reforming the State's relations 
with the peasantry on the basis of greater respect for grassroots autonomy. 
He places emphasis on the unwillingness of bureaucratic functionaries at the 
regional and local levels to accept the participation of peasant organisations 
in decision-making. The reason is clear enough. Functionaries often form an 
important part of alliances with local power-holders, including landowners 
and traders.60 
The implementation of the policy of concertacidn has provoked new 
problems for peasant organisations. In December 1988 the government 
announced its decision to help the poorest sectors through the National 
Solidarity Programme, PRONASOL. However, the new resources are 
controlled at the local level by municipal presidents and state governors who 
are often unwilling to channel funds to organisations which remain indepen-
dent of the PRI. This has been seen in a shift in policy implementation in 
1990. In 1989 there were greater opportunities for peasant groups to advance 
as the government sought to regain its credibility. Such a margin of man-
oeuvre appears to have been closed again and the relationship with federal 
government agencies has become much more mediated by state governors. 
The director of PRONASOL, Carlos Rojas, had created enemies with several 
governors as he could override their authority and channel funds directly to 
producer organisations. In response, in 1990 some governors have been 
blocking the flow of resources to agreed projects when independent groups 
are involved.61 Furthermore, most areas targeted by the government for 
assistance through PRONASOL are precisely those where the PRI lost in the 
July 1988 elections: La Laguna, Michoacan and Chalco (State of Mexico). 
The 1989 budget of three billion pesos translates into just 210,000 pesos a 
year (US$70) for the seventeen million Mexicans whom the government 
recognises as living in extreme poverty. According to opponents, the 
programme has become more a publicity campaign to help the image of the 
president and his party than a serious attempt to eradicate poverty.62 
Finally, Julio Moguel, a researcher at the National Autonomous University 
of Mexico, points out that around 80 per cent of the PRONASOL funds have 
in fact been channelled to PRI-affiliated groups, reflecting a clearly political 
goal to revitalise the grassroots organisations which support the official 
party.63 Control at the local level is achieved through 'municipal solidarity 
councils'. The councils are made up of the municipal president, one represen-
tative of the state governor and one municipal delegate. The council decides 
how resources from PRONASOL will be used and which groups will receive 
them. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the local opposition to 
influence decision-making. The relationship is no longer a direct one with the 
SARH or SPP and local caciques make political agreements to exclude the 
opposition organisations. It seems clear that peasant movements cannot rely 
on commitments from the federal government, since the crucial point at 
which resources are controlled is out of their hands, namely municipal and 
state government. Such a situation calls for greater emphasis on democratisat-
ion through electoral struggle, without abandoning the defence of sectoral 
demands. In this sense, Bartra points out the limits of concertacion in 
Mexico's new political environment since July 1988. In a critique of 
Gordillo's focus on State-peasant relations, Bartra calls for a broader analysis 
of the relations between peasant organisations and other social movements, 
including opposition parties. He sees a danger in the reproduction of familiar 
patterns of negotiation between State agencies and peasant movements since 
this excludes not only poorer peasants but also the PRD. Thus, for Bartra, 
negotiations can no longer be the exclusive domain of the State but must 
allow space for this new party. He therefore warns that: 
'In times of crisis and political transition, to depoliticise negotiations with 
the State and promote important reforms outside the arena of the new 
opposition, tends, by omission, to legitimise the existing political system 
and can end up as neo-clientelism; a technocratic and 'modern' corpor-
atism but as oppressive as the previous system.'64 
Conclusions: 
identity, strategy and the 'moment of vision' 
The prospects for the new agrarian movement in the 1990s are not as 
favourable as some suggest. Self-managed, democratic production remains a 
distant goal for many whose reality is one of diminishing control over their 
lives. Between defensive strategies of resistance and new linkages with the 
State there is a crucial absence of an alternative project for the countryside. 
Elements of such a project are clearly still there and grassroots movements 
fight to keep them alive, but they have not been articulated in a unifying 
project to contest that of the de la Madrid and Salinas governments. As a 
result, the historic demands for land and support for the social sector have 
become unmoored from any central programme for social change. 
As the regime severs its traditional ties with the majority of its rural 
constituents, new possibilities come into play. No doubt the government 
believes it can handle isolated rebellions and cries of fraud as the full 
implications of the model are felt. Yet it is playing with fire when the rebels 
show a capacity to unite. Paradoxically, it seems, after two decades of 
autonomy from parties, peasant movements in the 1990s may find that their 
greatest hope lies again with a party, but a new type of party, one that 
challenges effectively for political power while also carrying out political 
work at the grassroots. Whether the PRD is this party or can become so will 
be decisive not only for an alternative vision of rural development but also 
for the PRD itself and is an issue which requires further research. In the 
meantime both CNPA and UNORCA face a difficult future. 
CNPA organisations have been forced back into their local and regional 
corners, isolated and weakened by both repression and internal divisions. The 
demand for land redistribution in 1990 has not disappeared but it has lost its 
weight in the ideological struggle. In previous decades land reform consti-
tuted a central link between State and peasantry. The authorities would 
attempt to justify negative responses to land petitions on the grounds of the 
particular case. The right to petition was not questioned. This has changed in 
the 1980s. The link has been purposefully broken and land reform has been 
brought to an end. Previous administrations stretching back to Calles in the 
1920s triumphantly declared that land reform had reached its limits. They 
were always thwarted by renewed peasant mobilisation, reminding them that 
land hunger still existed. So it was for Diaz Ordaz in 1964, Lopez Portillo 
in 1976 and de la Madrid in 1982. The co-ordinated actions of CNPA in 
1979-84 just about kept land reform on the agenda for yet another sexenio. 
However, by 1988 the war had been lost even if some important battles 
continued, notably those of the OCEZ in Chiapas and the UCEZ in Michoa-
can. The principal role of the agrarian authorities was no longer to administer 
land petitions but certificates of non-affectability. Although this may have 
benefited a small proportion of relatively successful ejidos, the main winners 
were the promoters of the policy - the private landowners and the CNA. The 
divisions in CNPA thus occurred precisely at the moment when it most 
needed unity to confront the offensive launched by the landowners' associ-
ations. Instead, national co-ordination fell away as efforts were re-directed at 
defending particular land claims in the face of local aggression and official 
intransigence. 
A second link between State and peasantry had been the programmes of 
rural development. Again, in the 1980s these have been systematically 
dismantled by the neoliberal policies adopted to meet the economic crisis. 
The break-up and privatisation of State companies, the withdrawal of 
subsidies, the reduction in public investment and credit have all severely 
affected the social sector. In the optimistic language of concertacidn, the 
State has recognised its bureaucratic inefficiencies and has decided to retreat 
and hand over its functions to the direct producers. Indebted ejidatarios in 
this way are cut off from BANRURAL which now only deals with the 
profitable and the viable. For the rest, there is PRONASOL and exhortations 
to be self-reliant in the ever-receding hope of 'development'. For the more 
fortunate ejidatarios who can produce for the market neoliberalism has 
almost completely broken with the final strand of State support, the guarantee 
prices. As noted above, prices for the basic staples fell dramatically in the 
past decade, despite the efforts of UNORCA. As with CNPA, it appears that 
macro-economic policy decisions are untouched by popular demands. The 
most UNORCA could expect was to negotiate at a much lower level the 
implementation of policies already decided by the economic cabinet and the 
World Bank. 
The most worrying possibility is not that the State replaces old forms of 
mediation with new ones, to dismantle corporatism while at the same time 
introducing new institutional channels with which to distribute scarce 
resources and maintain stability. This is happening at all levels and comes as 
no great surprise. The real problem is when the new links are much weaker 
than the old ones, both in terms of providing material improvements (a road, 
a new school, an irrigation ditch, etc.) and in terms of reproducing a minimal 
level of acceptance of the political order. It is too early to say how PRONA-
SOL and the convenios de concertacidn compare with the promise of land 
reform and earlier rural development programmes. There are regions where 
the new rules will be seen as disempowering and others where they will be 
seen as liberating. This may accentuate the 'defensive autonomy' versus 
'institutional linkage' dichotomy even further as some of the more radicalised 
groups in the former category look to other, more violent means to achieve 
their demands, while the more economically viable groups in the second 
category manage to consolidate their position and use the system to their own 
advantage. Yet these will represent extremes of political action and, as 
already suggested, will not provide models for broader social transformation. 
The test for the system and for peasant leaders will come from the responses 
of the majority which lies between these two extremes. Stability with change 
is also, of course, highly dependent on the capacity of the government's 
economic strategy to generate enough resources to distribute among the 
population and, in the case of the rural sector, reverse the process of 
decapitalisation. Clearly, the implications for peasant organisations of trade 
liberalisation and the GATT agreements on agriculture require urgent 
attention. In the meantime no peasant movement or political party can afford 
the luxury of expecting agricultural workers, small producers and the landless 
to rally automatically to their call. 
In this respect it is worth noting that since 1988 a new array of peasant 
groups has emerged, stretching our powers of concentration to the limit by 
extending still further the glossary of acronyms. Yet they are obviously more 
than acronyms and may provide the basis of an even broader agrarian 
movement in the 1990s. Some (as in Oaxaca and Chiapas) seek links at the 
international level with non-governmental agencies such as the Inter-
American Foundation or alternative marketing outlets such as Twin Trading. 
Others, with 1992 in mind, have organised in defence of the rights and 
cultures of indigenous peoples. Examples are the Frente Independiente de 
Pueblos Indios (FIPI) and the Union de Comunidades Indigenas de la Zona 
Norte del Istmo de Tehuantepec (UCIZONI). Other grassroots projects 
include the formation of networks of producers of particular products. The 
largest is the Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras (CNOC), 
which brings together twenty regional coffee-producing organisations in eight 
states. Such movements can help create new spaces for democratic and 
popular participation and win real material gains. In fact, it is from such 
concrete experiences as those developed by CNPA, UNORCA and the new 
organisations that political and ideological alternatives must draw their 
inspiration. Only in this way can their potential for achieving social and 
political change be enhanced. 
The more sober assessment of the new agrarian movement may be 
applicable to other popular movements in Mexico and Latin America. 
Zermeno (1990) argues that Mexican society has been hit by a 'double 
disorder'. First came the extremely rapid urbanisation and modernisation of 
the post-1940 period, creating a vast array of social problems and inequal-
ities; then, just as the model was put into new gear by the oil-debt boom, 
came the economic crisis, smashing emerging social identities into a thousand 
pieces and derailing the Utopia of modernity. In this account, popular 
movements are the exception to the general scenario of atomisation, self-
withdrawal, social disorder and the pulverisation of collective identities. The 
crisis has been so deep, the neoliberal medicine so austere, that existing 
forms of intermediation (parties, unions, peasant movements, etc.) have been 
unable to represent popular demands. Not only are opposition groups 
affected. In Mexico, the PRI's own confederations proved ineffective and 
their low esteem was displayed for all in the 1988 elections. Zermeno 
concludes that the atomisation of society allows for the return of populist-
style leaders who can establish a direct appeal with the masses. He suggests 
that Cuauhtemoc Cardenas filled this role. Those movements which do 
survive fight a defensive battle for the sake of 'restricted identities'. 
Foweraker (1990) has questioned this approach by emphasising the 
strategic capacities of popular movements to gain institutional recognition and 
thereby erode some of the system's clientelistic and corporatist lines of 
control. Drawing on the experience of the democratic teachers' movement, he 
focuses on the type of pragmatic strategies seen in UNORCA. Confrontation 
with the State is avoided at all costs. The aim is to increase the movement's 
capacidad de gestion, that is, its ability to act on the legal and institutional 
terrain which links State and civil society. Foweraker recognises that 
sometimes this 'institutionalise strategy may back-fire and is open to the 
perennial problem of co-optation. Yet the result is not pre-determined. It is 
contingent on the way in which struggles alter the balance of forces around 
specific issues, or, in Gramscian terminology, the 'war of position'. 
What is clear from each of these approaches is the need to avoid 
generalisations about the strategic capacities of popular movements. Some 
have clearly been more successful than others for reasons which go beyond 
the movements in question and the scope of this paper. Teachers and urban 
popular movements have been more successful than peasants and students in 
their struggle to gain linkage on their own terms. We could disaggregate even 
further and show how certain regional expressions of these movements have 
increased their capacidad de gestion more than others. Other elements come 
into play, such as the internal conflicts within the State apparatus and the 
particular structures which can enable political action (Cook, 1990). Analysis 
must therefore be sensitive to changes both at the grassroots and in the wider 
political context. Furthermore it must bring out the relationship between the 
two processes (Craig, 1990). 
Returning to a more concrete level, the challenge of rural democratisation 
in Mexico raises the possibility of closer ties between the PRD and peasant 
movements in order to prevent electoral fraud and win rural districts. Such 
a strategy would be nothing new. In the countryside, control of municipal 
government has traditionally been linked to land struggles. This was the 
central axis of the Zapatistas' struggle for land and power. It was also the 
goal of Jaramillo and the PAOM in Morelos in the 1950s, the Asociacion 
Civica Guerrerense (ACG) in the 1960s and the COCEI in the 1980s, to 
name but a few. Although the post-1968 movements were generally suspi-
cious of parties, the renewed importance of the electoral arena in the 1980s 
has re-opened the possibility for co-ordinated action. Evidence since 1988 is 
not too promising, but neither is it conclusive and it remains to be seen how 
the party-movement relationship is established. 
Yet these are still largely strategic issues. What will be more important is 
the type of party the PRD becomes and the vision, or rather the visions, it 
articulates. In short, a new type of party has to be popular and not populist, 
capable of uniting a broad front of popular aspirations in a struggle to 
democratise both State and civil society. In the day-to-day struggle to extract 
resources and gain respect for basic rights the immediate concern is not to 
lose linkage with those in positions of power. This is understandable. Being 
cut off can spell the demise of a movement. Yet as all the strategising goes 
on, the enemies' political and ideological offensive may go unchallenged. 
This is the situation now faced by CNPA, UNORCA and a host of popular 
organisations. The vision of an alternative project for rural Mexico and its 
articulation with a broader project for social transformation has been 
displaced as the here-and-now becomes their testing ground. 
In dealing with these dilemmas Munck suggests that we need to differen-
tiate between two different 'moments' of political activity.65 The first is the 
construction of a collective identity of difference; the second is the moment 
of collective action (which is full of the ambiguities of strategic decisions 
taken in relation to the shifting balance of forces). In this way, he returns 
identity to the same plane as strategy and, in doing so, argues for a different 
method of measuring the impact of popular movements on the political 
system than that which looks solely for changes in the legal and institutional 
terrain. This position does not necessarily lead us back to Evers 's 
romanticised view of flourishing counter-cultures at a distance from the 
political system.66 Instead, it recognises the need for a combination of identity 
and strategy, of autonomy and realism. If this is so, perhaps we need to think 
of the necessary conditions for a third 'moment', when the contradictions 
between the two are dissolved. Only this 'moment of vision' can overcome 
the limitations of 'institutionalism' and the retreat into sectarianism. For, as 
David Harvey warns, the apparently positive elements of post-modernism -
the emphasis on community and locality, social movements and regional 
resistances - can lead to regressive politics: 
'..it is hard to stop the slide into parochialism, myopia and self-referential-
ity in the face of the universalizing force of capital circulation. At worst 
it brings us back to narrow and sectarian politics in which respect for 
others gets mutilated in the fires of competition between the fragments.'67 
The current absence of such a vision leaves few options for peasant 
movements in Mexico. CNPA continues to be divided between ultra-radicals 
and new pragmatists, with the latter moving closer to the position of 
UNORCA in defence of the social sector. Yet it remains to be seen how long 
UNORCA and other members of the CAP can continue negotiating with the 
government when current policies do not appear to offer adequate solutions 
to the problems of decapitalisation, unemployment, landlessness and 
repression. If the new agrarian movement is to have a greater impact it must 
revive or develop the positive achievements and progressive insights of 
CNPA and UNORCA - the politicisation of demands, the promotion of broad 
participation, the stubborn resistance to the loss of land and control over 
production, the micro-level projects of rural co-operatives and self-manage-
ment, the democratisation of ejidos and the defence of human rights and 
indigenous cultures. Although these advances have been important, particular-
ly at the regional level, their full contribution to political and social change 
in Mexico has yet to be felt. 
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Appendix I: Principal peasant movements in Mexico 
Organisation Year formed Affiliation Presence 
CNC 1938 PRI 
UGOCM 1949 PPS 
CCI (faction rejoined 1963 MLN 
PRI in 1979) 
CAM 1970 PRI 
(split from CCI) 
UGOCM-Jacinto 1973 PRI 
Lopez 
MNCP 1974 PRI 
(split from CCI) 
CIOAC 1975 independent but 
(split from CCI) supports PRD 
UNTA 
MNPA 
CNPA 
UNORCA 
CODUC 
UGOCP 
1978 
1979 
1979 
1985 
1986 
1986 
PST 
independent 
independent 
independent 
independent 
independent but 
supports PRD 
national 
BCN, Sin, Son 
national 
Ver, Hid, SLP, 
Gto 
Jal, Mich, Oax, 
Son, Sin, BCN 
Ver, Hid, Pue, 
Dur, Gto, Oax 
national (strong-
est in northwest 
and Chiapas) 
national 
national 
national 
national 
Ver, Gto, Tab 
Ver, Pue, Tlax, 
Son, Gto, Hid, 
Jal, Gto 
CCC 1988 PFCRN national 
Appendix II: Evolution of the CNPA and ethnic and regional composition 
Oct 79 Apr 80 Nov 80 Aug 81 Jul 82 Jan 83 Sep 83 Nov 84 
UCI UCI UCI UCI UCI UCI UCI UCI 
(Nahautl- Puebla, Veracruz) 
COMA COMA COMA COMA COMA COMA COMA COMA 
(Nahuatl-Federal District) 
UCEZ UCEZ UCEZ UCEZ UCEZ UCEZ UCEZ UCEZ 
(Purepechas, mazahuas, otomfes- Michocan) 
UEIS UEIS UEIS UEIS UEIS UEIS UEIS UEIS 
(Sinaloa) 
ACR ACR ACR ACR ACR ACR ACR ACR 
(Guanajuato, Chiapas, Jalisco, Tamaulipas) 
CIOAC (National) 
MNPA (National) 
CONACAR (National) 
CNPI CNPI 
(National) 
CECVYM (Sonora) 
ODECO ODECO 
(National) 
CCRI CRI CCRI CCRI CCRI CCRI CCRI 
(Sonora, Guerrero, Veracruz, Coahila) 
COCEI COCEI COCEI COCEI COCEI COCEI 
(Zapotecas- Oaxaca) 
UPM UPM UPM UPM UPM UPM 
(Nahuatl- Morelos) 
UELC UELC UELC 
(Nayarit) 
CCH CCH CCH CCH CCH 
(Huastecos- San Luis Potosf) 
FPZ FPZ FPZ FPZ FPZ 
(Zacatecas) 
CDP CDP CDP CDP 
(Chihuahua) 
OCIHV OCIHV OCIHV OCIHV 
(Veracruz) 
OIPUH OIPUH OIPUH OIPUH 
(Nahuatl, otomfes- Hidalgo, Veracruz, San Luis Potosf) 
BCCH BCCH 
(Tzotziles, tzeltales- Chiapas) 
OCEZ OCEZ OCEZ 
(Tzotziles, tzeltales- Chiapas) 
OPA OPA OPA OPA 
(Otomfes- Tlaxcala, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Puebla) 
MULT MULT MULT MULT 
(Triquis- Oaxaca) 
MLR MLR MLR 
(Amuzgos- Guerrero) 
ORCO ORCO ORCO 
(Jalisco, Nayarit) 
OPL OPL OPL 
(Chatinos- Oaxaca) 
FCI FCI 
(Chinantecos- Oaxaca) 
UTC 
(Guerrero, Oaxaca) 
Glossary of acronyms 
ACG Asociacion Cfvica Guerrerense 
ACR Alianza Campesina Revolucionaria 
ALCANO Alianza Campesina del Noroeste 
ANAGSA Aseguradora Nacional Agricola y Ganadera 
BANRURAL Banco Nacional de Credito Rural 
BCCH Bloque Campesino de Chiapas 
CAM Confederation Agrarista Mexicana 
CAP Congreso Agrario Permanente 
CAU Convenio de Accion Unitaria 
CCC Central Campesina Cardenista 
CCH Comite Coordinador Huasteco 
CCI Central Campesina Independiente 
CCRI Coordinadora Campesina Revolucionaria Independiente 
CCU Central Campesina Unitaria 
CDP Comite de Defensa Popular (Chihuahua) 
CECVYM Coalition de Ejidos Colectivos de los Valles Yaqui y 
Mayo 
CIOAC Central Independiente de Obreros Agrfcolas y 
Campesinos 
CNA Consejo Nacional Agropecuario 
CNC Confederation Nacional Campesina 
CNOC Cooordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Cafetaleras 
CNPA Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala 
CNPI Consejo Nacional de Pueblos Indfgenas 
CNPI Coordinadora Nacional de Pueblos Indigenas 
CNTE Coordinadora Nacional de Trabajadores de la Education 
COCEI Coalition Obrera Campesina Estudiantil del Istmo 
CODUC Comision Organizadora de la Unidad Campesina 
COMA Comuneros Organizados de Milpa Alta 
CONACAR Consejo Nacional Cardenista 
CONASUPO Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares 
FCI Frente Campesino Independiente de Oaxaca 
FDCCh Frente Democratico Campesino de Chihuahua 
FDN Frente Democratico Nacional 
FIPI Frente Independiente de Pueblos Indios 
FNCR Frente Nacional Contra la Represion 
FPZ Frente Popular de Zacatecas 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
LM Lfnea de Masas 
LP Linea Proletaria 
MDC Movimiento Democratico Campesino de Chihuahua 
MLN Movimiento de Liberation Nacional 
MLR Movimiento de Lucha Revolucionaria 
MNCP Movimiento Nacional de los Cuatrocientos Pueblos 
MNPA Movimiento Nacional Plan de Ayala 
MULT Movimiento de Unification y Lucha Triqui 
OCEZ Organizacion Campesina Emiliano Zapata 
OCIHV Organization Campesina Independiente de la Huasteca 
Veracruzana 
ODECO Organization y Desarrollo de la Comunidad 
OIPUH Organization Independiente de Pueblos Unidos de las 
Huastecas 
OPA Organization de Pueblos del Altiplano 
OPL Organization para la Liberation 
ORCO Organization Regional Campesina de Occidente 
PAN Partido de Action Nacional 
PAOM Partido Agrario Obrero Morolense 
PCM Partido Comunista Mexicano 
PECE Pacto para la estabilidad y el crecimiento economico 
PFCRN Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstruction Nacional 
PMS Partido Mexicano Socialista 
PND Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 
PP Polftica Popular 
PP Partido Popular 
PPS Partido Popular Socialista 
PRD Partido de la Revolution Democratica 
PRI Partido Revolucionario Institutional 
PRONASOL Programa Nacional de Solidaridad 
PRT Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores 
PSE Pacto de Solidaridad Economica 
PST Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores 
PSUM Partido Socialista Unificado de Mexico 
SAM Sistema Alimentario Mexicano 
SARH Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos 
SEDUE Secretarfa de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologfa 
SPP Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto 
SRA Secretaria de la Reforma Agraria 
UCEZ Union de Comuneros Emiliano Zapata 
UCI Union Campesina Independiente 
UCIZONI Union de Comunidades Indfgenas de la Zona Norte del 
Istmo 
UEEZ Union de Ejidos Emiliano Zapata 
UEIS Union de Ejidos Independientes de Sinaloa 
UELC Union de Ejidos Lazaro Cardenas 
UGOCM Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico 
UGOCP Union General Obrera Campesina Popular 
UNICEF United Nations Childrens' Fund 
UNORCA Union Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campes-
inas Autonomas 
UNTA Union Nacional de Trabajadores Agricolas 
UPM Union de Pueblos de Morelos 
UTC Union de Trabajadores del Campo 
UU Union de Uniones Ejidales y Grupos Campesinos 
Solidarios de Chiapas 
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